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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JURISDICTION: Lesser Included Offenses of Enumerated Crimes
Under the Major Crimes Act.
United States v. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1992).
During an altercation on Indian land, an Indian, Walkingeagle,
pushed his girlfriend, pulled her hair, poured beer on her, and kicked
and hit her in the face, lacerating her lip. The Cherokee tribal court
charged him with assault and battery. For the same offense, federal
prosecutors indicted Walkingeagle for two felonies, assault with a
dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, and assault resulting
in serious bodily injury. The Cherokee tribal court dismissed its charges
against Walkingeagle without prejudice, pending the outcome of the
federal proceedings.
At the conclusion of the government's case, Walkingeagle moved
for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court found that a single blow
of the defendant's hand did not make the hand a "dangerous weapon"
or an object used in a manner likely to endanger life or cause serious
bodily harm.' The trial court further found that the victim's lacerated
lip did not rise to the level of "serious bodily injury."' 2 In so finding,
the trial court granted Walkingeagle's motion for acquittal on the
felonies but then instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of
assault by striking, beating, or wounding.
3
The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the lesser included offense after it granted a
judgment of acquittal on the felonies. The Major Crimes Act4 confers
jurisdiction to the federal courts over enumerated felonies committed
by Indians on Indian lands.5 Jurisdiction over non-enumerated crimes
is not specifically conferred and ordinarily remains with the tribal
courts.6 The felonies with which Walkingeagle was charged and ac-
quitted are enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, but the lesser included
offense is not.
7
1. United States v. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Assault by striking, beating, or wounding is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)
(1988).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
5. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d at 553.
6. Id.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988).
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The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Keeble
v. United States' and language in the Major Crimes Act, 9 which states
that Indians charged with enumerated crimes shall be tried in the same
manner as non-Indians committing offenses within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States. 10 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that Indians should benefit from and be subject to lesser included
offense instructions in the same way that non-Indians are in federal
criminal trials."
Walkingeagle distinguished Keeble by noting that the defendant in
that case requested a lesser included offense instruction to be submitted
along with instructions on the felony. 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the decision in Keeble established a procedural requirement that
Major Crimes Act trials be conducted in the same manner as non-
Major Crimes Act trials in federal court and rejected Walkingeagle's
argument. 13 The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the trial court
retains jurisdiction over non-enumerated lesser included offenses even
though the trier of fact determines that there is insufficient evidence
of the "major crime."
4
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton noted that the Cherokee
tribal court dismissed the assault charges pending the outcome of the
federal case and would have retained jurisdiction over the lesser in-
cluded offense." Judge Hamilton felt that the trial court should have
deferred to the Cherokee tribal court after its finding that there was
insufficient evidence of the "major crimes. ' 16
8. 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
9. 181 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988).
10. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d at 553.
11. Id.
12. Il.
13. Id. at 553-54.
14. Id. at 554.
15. Ia. at 555 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
16. Judge Hamilton stated:
What the United States may not do directly, it may now accomplish by
indirection under the majority's holding. District courts are now empow-
ered to try a host of crimes previously reserved to the tribal courts by the
express direction of Congress by the simple expedient of those crimes being
classified as lesser included offenses of the specifically enumerated crimes
in C- 1153. The majority's decision invites creative charging by federal
prosecutors under the [Major Crimes] Act for the purpose of obtaining
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
JURISDICTION: Tribal Sovereign Immunity Where the Tribe is an
Indispensable Party.
Pembina Treaty Committee v. Lujan, 980 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1992).
The U.S. Treasury Department and Congress set aside $52 million
to be distributed to five groups of Pembina Chippewa Indians. These
funds were set aside as a result of a lawsuit several years ago. Congress
established a mechanism for distributing the funds.' Eighty percent
was to be distributed to individual tribal members. The remaining
twenty percent was to be placed in trust and invested by the Secretary
of the Interior for the tribe's benefit. 2 Interest from the trust was to
be distributed to the governing body of the tribe on an "annual
budgetary basis" subject to the approval of the Secretary. The money
was to be used for tribal administration or social and economic
programs.
3
A group of individual tribal members known as the Pembina Treaty
Committee (the Committee) sued, among others, the Secretary of the
Interior, Manual Lujan, and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians (the Tribe). The Committee sought a declaratory judgment
that the federal trustees had breached their fiduciary duty by failing
to require an annual budget from the Tribe before releasing the money.
The Committee also asked the trial court to declare the Tribe's spend-
ing plan for 1991 invalid. The Committee further requested an order
compelling the Tribe to place any unspent 1991 funds into escrow
pending the adoption of a valid spending plan and compelling an
accounting from the trustees. Finally, the Committee requested a
preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the
Tribe prohibiting distribution of unspent funds.
The Tribe moved for its dismissal from the suit, claiming sovereign
immunity. The federal defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint
altogether, claiming that the Tribe was an indispensable party. The
trial court granted both motions. The Committee appealed, claiming
that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint
and in not affording the Committee a hearing on the motions.
The Tribe was indisputably immune from suit; therefore, the only
issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the Tribe was an indis-
pensable party. If the Tribe was not an indispensable party, the suit
1. See Act of Dec. 31, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-403, 96 Stat. 2022, 2022-23.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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could proceed; otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed for want
of an indispensable party.
4
The Eighth Circuit noted that rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that the trial court "determine whether in
equity and good conscience" the suit should proceed without the absent
party, and in so determining should consider the adequacy of and
prejudice resulting from a remedy granted in the party's absence.' The
trial court is also to consider whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the complaint is dismissed altogether.6 The court then found
that any judgment against the federal defendants would jeopardize the
Tribe's ability to use money it had already received .7 The court deter-
mined that any declaration affecting the disbursement of future funds,
without the Tribe's participation in the proceedings, would be an
encroachment on the Tribe's right of self-governance. 8
Even though the Committee admittedly had no other legal recourse,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit for
want of an indispensable party. 9 The dismissal upheld the Tribe's
interest in self-governance, and left the plaintiffs to seek a remedy
within tribal political processes. 0
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: Defining "Indian" for Purposes of Eligi-
bility to Participate in Native American Religion Activities in Prison.
Bear v. Nix, 977 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1992).
Gary Bear, a prisoner in the Iowa State Penitentiary (the prison),
sued prison warden, Crispus Nix, and the prison's Native American
Religion (NAR) consultant, Ken Bordeaux, for violating Bear's civil
rights.' To avoid the constitutionally sensitive task of determining who
would be eligible to participate in NAR activities, the prison hired
Bordeaux as a consultant. Bordeaux is an enrolled tribal member and
spiritual leader in NAR who began working with the prison in 1985.
In 1988, he was given the exclusive authority to determine who may
participate in NAR activities.
Bordeaux determined that only enrolled tribal members would be
eligible to participate in NAR activities. This excluded Bear, who is
4. Set? FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a).




9. Id. at 546.
10. Id.
1. Suit was filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which
allows civil actions to remedy rights violations committed by persons acting under color
of state law.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/7
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part Kiowa but does not have enough blood quantum to be an enrolled
member. Bear participated in NAR sporadically as a youth and more
frequently when he went to prison in 1981. He quit in September 1981,
then in 1986 again became very active. Until February 1988, when
Bordeaux was given the authority to determine NAR eligibility, Bear
had occasionally acted as firekeeper and door watcher for the sweat
lodge.
Bear claimed that the prison acquiesced to Bordeaux's eligibility
decision, thus depriving him of his First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion. The district court looked to a settlement agreement
entered into in 19902 between the prison and two Native American
inmates.3 The district court interpreted the settlement agreement to
allow an inmate to "genuinely self-identify" himself as a Native
American and accordingly ruled in favor of Bear, ordering defendants
to allow Bear to participate in NAR activities. Nix and Bordeaux
appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, Bordeaux was replaced
by a new consultant who continued to deny Bear the right to participate
in NAR practices.
The Eighth Circuit found no language in the settlement agreement
consistent with an inmate's right to "genuinely self-identify" himself
as a Native American, though it did acknowledge a provision allowing
an inmate to present "other evidence" to prove his Native American
status.4 The Eighth Circuit rejected Bear's argument that he has a right
to practice NAR notwithstanding the existence of or language in the
settlement agreement. s Bear relied on Turner v. Safley, 6 which held
that a prison regulation impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights
is only valid if it meets some legitimate penological interests.7 Bear
did not argue that Bordeaux's decision was the product of malice, bad
2. Walker v. Scurr, Civ. Nos. 83-313-D, 84-26-B (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 1990).
3. The agreement's terms relevant to membership and an understanding needed
in the case at bar are as follows:
A. Inmates who are Native Americans are entitled to participate in
Native American religious activities unless their participation would violate
the tenets of the Native American religion. An inmate claiming to be
Native American may do so by proof of an enrollment number in a Native
American tribe or by proof of eligibility to be an enrolled member of a
Native American tribe. In lieu of an enrollment number or proof of
eligibility to be an enrolled member of a Native American tribe, an inmate
claiming to be Native American may offer other evidence, such as corrob-
oration of tribal or family members, official records, physical appearance,
prior participation in Native American activities, etc. ...
Id., slip op. at 3-5, quoted in Bear v. Nix, 977 F.2d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir. 1992).
4. Bear, 977 F.2d at 1295.
5. Id. at 1293.
6. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
7. Id. at 89.
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faith, or unconstitutional motive, but he argued that his status as a
Native American is patently obvious. The Court refused to order the
consultant to allow Bear to participate in NAR activities.' The Eighth
Circuit held, "To review such decisions would require courts to de-
termine the meaning of religious doctrine and canonical law and to
impose a secular court's view of whether in the context of the particular
case religious doctrine and canonical law support the decision the
church authorities have made." 9
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and remanded
the case, ordering the consultant to determine whether Bear is a Native
American for purposes of NAR participation. The Eighth Circuit also
ordered the consultant to give Bear the opportunity to produce "other
evidence" of his Native American status. 10
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: Adversary Complaints Against a Tribe-
owned Business in Bankruptcy Proceedings.
Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992).
Mr. and Mrs. Greene purchased furniture from Mt. Adams Furni-
ture (Mt. Adams), a wholly-owned and operated business of the Yak-
ima Indian Nation (the Tribe). Though Mt. Adams had no security
interest in the furniture, they peaceably repossessed the furniture when
the Greenes failed to pay for it as agreed. Mt. Adams then took the
furniture back to its place of business in Wapato, Washington, on the
Yakima Indian reservation. Within ninety days of the repossession,
the Greenes filed for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,
thus rendering Mt. Adams' repossession a preferential transfer. The
trustee filed an adversary complaint to set aside the preferential trans-
fer. The Tribe appeared and claimed immunity from the adversary
proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the Tribe's claim and
entered a judgment against the Tribe in the amount of $8,779. The
district court affirmed the judgment.
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Tribe, as a
market or business participant, is immune from adversary proceedings
when the transaction in question, the repossession, took place off-
reservation. First, the court acknowledged the Tribe's common-law
8. Bear, 977 F.2d at 1294.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1295.
232
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immunity based on its original status as a sovereign.' The court then
looked at Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Department,
2
which held that immunity traditionally enjoyed by a tribe does not
extend to individual tribal members and businesses.3 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Puyallup decision did not address sovereign immunity
for off-reservation activities, nor did it address sovereign immunity
for businesses owned and managed directly by the tribe itself.
4
After an analysis of various state approaches to recognizing and
limiting tribal sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held
that the key to determining the validity of a sovereign immunity claim
is to look at the nature of the relationship involved.' The court, citing
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Potawatomi Tribe,6 noted that Con-
gress' support of the sovereign immunity doctrine is in the interest of
promoting Indian self-governance, self-sufficiency and economic de-
velopment.7 The court further noted that sovereign immunity, at com-
mon law, has an extraterritorial component.'
The court held that the Tribe was exercising its power as a sovereign
in the interest of enhancing the economic development of the Tribe
when it operated and managed Mt. Adams Furniture.9 The court
further held that the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding cannot pierce
the Tribe's extraterritorial immunity.10 The Ninth Circuit ordered the
dismissal of the adversary proceeding."
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
EQUAL PROTECTION: State Funding Reductions for Contracted
Social Programs for Indian Tribes.
Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, 975 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1992).
The federal government provides money to states under title XX of
the Social Security Act' to be used for human services. 2 In 1982, 1983,
1. Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
3. Id. at 171-73.
4. Greene, 980 F.2d at 592. In fact, the Puyallup decision was limited to the issue
of state regulation of fishing rights on and off reservation. Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 167.
5. Greene, 980 F.2d at 593.
6. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
7. Greene, 980 F.2d at 596.
8. Id. at 596-97.
9. Id. at 598.
10. Id.
11. Greene, 980 F.2d at 598.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1981).
2. Id.
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and 1984 the state of New Mexico allocated $466,277 per year to the
Navajo Nation for its home care program. In 1985, the state of New
Mexico allocated the same amount;3 however, prior to the disburse-
ment, the state settled a claim in an unrelated law suit and entered
into a consent decree. The consent decree required the state Human
Services Department (the Department) to spend an estimated $315,000
to form citizen review boards to oversee foster child placement. The
Department was only able to obtain $127,000 in additional funding
from the state legislature, leaving a shortfall of $188,000. The De-
partment then decided to cut 1985 allocations to the Navajo Nation
home care program by $188,000, from $466,277 to $278,000. The
Navajo Nation sued, claiming that the funding cut was discriminatory.
The district court found that the 1985 funding cut was facially
discriminatory, because it singled out Navajos, and alternatively found
that the cut was implemented with discriminatory intent. 4 In so finding,
the district court noted that the funding decision was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and that less burdensome
alternatives were available. Also, the district court found that the
spending cut had an immediate and direct effect only on NavajosA
The state based its argument on Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,6
which, according to the state, requires that discriminatory intent be
the primary motivation of the defendant in order for a state action to
be unconstitutional. 7 The Tenth Circuit noted that their argument
"relies on the state's omission of several key words whenever it quotes
Feeney, and is so trivial that we would not address it separately did
it not form the backbone of the state's appeal." ' The court then noted
that the correct standard is that "discriminatory motive exists when
action is taken at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 9
The court found that the funding was initially approved, but then,
"outside the normal procedural process and without considering the
normal substantive criteria," the Department decided to cut the Nay-
3. Because of the Navajo Nation's linguistic, cultural, and economic needs, the
state has chosen not to provide home care directly but rather to contract these services
to the Navajo Nation. The Navajo Nation followed standard procedures for submitting
its request for a contract to the state for ftnding its home care program. After following
its standard procedure for soliciting and reviewing proposed contracts, the Department
initially recommended a proposed contract for $446,277 with the Navajo Nation for
1985, which is $20,000 less than the previous three years. Navajo Nation v. New Mexico,
975 F.2d 741, 742 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. Id. at 743.
5. Id.
6. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
7. Id. at 272.
8. Navajo Nation, 975 F.2d at 744.
9. Id. at 743-44 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
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ajos' funding in favor of another program.'0 The court also found
that the Department and its secretary, Juan Vigil, knew that the cuts
would only affect Navajos." Finally, the court found that Navajos are
disadvantaged in the political process in New Mexico and that the
funding decision was based primarily on the fear of political retaliation
that would have occurred had the Department opted to cut other social
programs instead.' 2
The state claimed that home care is a low priority program and
that the contract with the Navajos is the only one sizeable enough to
remain viable after such a substantial cut. The state offered no expla-
nation as to why the noncontract (direct) home care program, with a
budget in excess of $800,000, received no cuts. The Tenth Circuit
found that "other contracts could have been reduced along with
reductions to the Navajo contract without destroying the viability of
their programs."' 3 The Tenth Circuit further noted that the state's
argument was not enhanced by its claim that budget cuts in noncontract
programs would result in massive layoffs in the state sector.' 4 The
court held that there is no legitimate reason to favor a forty percent
reduction in Navajo jobs over an equal number of job reductions in
the state sector.' In fact, the court felt that this argument supported
the Navajo's claim that the state unduly and exclusively burdened the
Navajo Nation with the state's budget shortfall. 6
The court held that the state is immune from a claim or award of
compensation for past wrongs but held also that the district court's
injunction proscribing future wrongs was appropriate. 7 The court
reaffirmed the reasoning and holding in Papasan v. Allain that the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prevents
a court from granting an award compensating a plaintiff for a state's
past illegal acts but allows a court to remedy a present and ongoing
violation.' 9 The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's order meets
10. Id. at 744.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 744.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 744-45.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 745.
17. Id. at 745-46. The district court's order enjoined the state from funding the
Navajo Nation's title XX contract services for the present and subsequent years for less
than $446,277, unless a lower level of funding can be justified by the need for those
services on the Navajo Nation or in Navajo Indian Country and from administering
and allocating title XX funds in any manner that fails to ensure the availability of title
XX services to Navajo Indians at the same level, relative to their need, as those services
are available to all New Mexicans. Id.
18. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
19. Navajo Nation, 975 F.2d at 745 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278-82).
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the requirements of Papasan and affirmed the order and the district
court's decision. 20
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
INDIAN GAMING: Sufficiency of Governor's Signature on Class III
Gaming Compact to Render Compact Binding on the State.
State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992).
This original action in mandamus and quo warranto was brought
by the state of Kansas, ex rel., Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General,
against the Governor of Kansas, Joan Finney. The case included the
following chronology of the events which led to the present action:
August 28, 1991 - Kickapoo Nation in Kansas served a
request on Governor Finney to negotiate a tribal-state com-
pact relative to Class III gaming activities on its reservation.
January 16, 1992 - Kickapoo Nation and Governor
Finney execute a tribal-state compact.
January 22, 1992 - Original tribal-state compact is re-
ceived by the Department of the Interior for approval.
January 24, 1992 - Kansas House Concurrent Resolution
introduced which urges the Secretary of the Interior to
withhold approval of the compact because the Kansas Leg-
islature's approval thereof is required .... (Bill died Jan-
uary 27, 1992.)
February 5, 1992 - Action herein filed ....
February 11, 1992 - House Bill No. 2928 introduced
... which would authorize Governor or her designated
representative to negotiate tribal-state compacts ... on be-
half of the State .... (Bill died in committee May 26,
1992).
February 25, 1992 - Senate Bill No. 739 introduced
which would create the Kansas Legislative Commission on
State-Indian Affairs which would be charged with negotia-
tion of tribal-state compacts. (Bill died in committee, May
26, 1992.)
February 28, 1992 - Department of Interior notifies the
Kickapoo Nation that [the department's assessment] ...
will be deferred pending resolution of the court proceeding.
20. ld. at 745.
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March 13, 1992 - Letter from Department of the Interior
to the Kickapoo Nation advising [that the] Department will
approve compact if the Kansas Supreme Court determines
that "the Governor is authorized to bind the state to the
compact" ....
May 19, 1992 - Declaratory judgment/mandamus action
filed in United States District Court for the District of
Columbia by the Kickapoo Nation and Governor of Kansas
... to compel approval of compact by the Secretary [of
the Interior] based upon the running of the statutory 45-
day period for approval.'
The narrow issue before the Kansas Supreme Court was whether
the Governor has the authority to bind the state to a tribal-state
compact with the Kickapoo Nation (the Tribe). The attorney general
argued that the power to bind is a legislative rather than executive
function. The governor argued that the Kansas Constitution,2 Kansas
Statutes, 3 and the language of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)4 give her the authority to negotiate for and enter into tribal-
state compacts.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that section 75-107 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated does not apply because the compact is between the
governor and the Tribe, not between the governor and the federal
government.5 Also, the statute did not apply because "the transaction
of business connotes the day-to-day operation of government under
previously established law or public policy."' 6 The governor's act,
according to the court, was not pursuant to any existing law but was
an "enactment of law and determination of public policy."
'7
The court noted provisions in state law8 which give the governor
limited powers to make law and determinations of public policy.9 In
1. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1173-74 (Kan. 1992). The 45-
day period for approval is specified in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8) (1988).
2. KAN. CoNsr. art. 1, § 3. The Governor is the supreme executive power of
Kansas. Id.
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-107 (1989) provides that "The Governor shall transact
all business of the state, civil and military, with the [federal] government, except in
cases otherwise specifically provided by law."
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
5. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Kan. 1992).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-925 (1989) provides that the governor, during a state of
disaster or emergency, may issue orders and proclamations which shall have the force
and effect of law.
9. Finney, 836 P.2d at 1179.
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the absence of any statutory authority, the governor, according to the
court, is without the authority to negotiate for and enter into tribal-
state compacts. 0 The court noted that language in the compact pur-
ports to create or authorizes the creation of agencies or commissions
and/or the expansion of existing agencies or commissions." To bind
the state to this agreement, according to the court, is beyond the
statutory or constitutional authority of the governor and falls within
a power reserved for the legislature.' 2 The court found no constitutional
impediment to the governor's authority to enter into negotiations but
found the power to bind the state to the compact a different matter. 3
10. Id. at 1185.
11. Id. at 1182-83.
12. Id. at 1184.
13. Id. at 1185.
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